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James McConnell
As a theoretical physicist I welcome the stimulus provided by this
Symposium to delve a little into epistemological problems which were always
around but which multiplied considerably in the present century due largely to
the advent of quantum mechanics. By way of introduction I shall recall some
early investigations into quantum theory associated with the names of
Heisenberg and Schr’odinger, and the controversy between these two physicists
regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics (Moore, 1989).
We shall commence by mentioning some of the pioneering studies of the
problem of finding a replacement for classical mechanics that would be valid
for physical systems of atomic dimensions. Heisenberg was greatly influenced
by a paper of Bohr, Kramers and Slater, in which it was proposed that an atom
may be pictured as a set of oscillators with frequencies equal to its
absorption frequencies. He set out to establish an atomic theory based
entirely on observables like frequencies, amplitudes and polarizations of
spectral lines. According to Balmer the frequency v of the visible lines of
the hydrogen spectrum is given by
1 1
= Rc(—
- —v), (1)
where R is the Rydberg constant, c is the velocity of light in vacuo and n is
an integer greater than 2. Ritz generalized (1) to
nm = Rc( - (2)
with
m = 1,2, .
.. ; n 2,3 n>m.
2.
Experiments by Ritz and Rydberg yielded the relation
hvnm = E - Em,
where h is the Planck constant, E is the initial and Em is the final energy of
the atom. Thus for a set of energy levels, which might be infinite, we can
display the values of
‘nm
as a matrix. When
‘nm
is negative, it refers to
absorption.
In analogy with (2) Heisenberg described the position q of an electron by
a matrix with elements
exp (2111\)nt)
and the momentum p of the electron by a matrix with elements
nm
exp (2irivnmt)•
In collaboration with Born and Jordan he postulated that q and p are matrices
satisfying (Heisenberg, Born and Jordan, 1925)
ihqp - pq = — I,
2”
where I is the identity matrix. He also supposed that Hamilton’s canonical
equations
aH aH
q =— , p =
where H is the Hamiltonian of the system, are satisfied. Born, Heisenberg and
Jordan made no attempt to construct a pictorial representation of what is
happening in the atomic region when, for example, a spectral line is emitted.
Their approach was that of the positivist school associated with the name of
Ernst Mach, according to whom the sole purpose of scientific theory is to
provide an economical way of recording observed experimental facts.
Mach’s philosophy of science was not shared by Erwin Schr$dinger, who in
1926 published a sequence of papers dealing with the emerging quantum mechanics
(Schr5dinger, 1928). In the first paper he derived a wave equation for the
hydrogen atom from the Hamilton-Jacobi equation combined with the use of the
calculus of variations and of certain boundary conditions. In the second paper
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Schrodinger pointed out the analogy between classical mechanics and geometrical
optics, and he suggested that there should exist an essentially classical
theory of matter waves which would have the role in mechanics that Maxwell’s
theory of electromagnetic waves has in optics. This would require a particle
of a mechanical system to be represented by a wave packet, namely, a group of
waves with small dimensions in every direction. The same would be true for the
image point of a mechanical system, that is, the point specified in
multidimensional space by the generalized coordinates of the system. Thus
Schrdinger appears to have thought that a classical wave picture based on
continuous matter waves could provide a basis for atomic physics.
In the first paper Schro’dinger obtained for a particle of mass m the
wave equation, now known as Schrdinger’s equation,
+ 82m (E - V) = 0,
h2
where V is the potential of the particle, E is its total energy and 4’ is the
wave function. In terms of cartesian coordinates
= J +J.. +J.
x2 y2 z2
but for generalized coordinates q1, q2, .. with twice the kinetic energy
2T
= ik bjkik
is a complicated function of the bik’s.
It was next shown by Schrdinger that his wave mechanics is equivalent to
the Born-Heisenberg-Jordan matrix mechanics, if the matrix representatives of
the dynamical variables are calculated with respect to the basis constituted by
the normalized elgenfunctions of the Hamiltonian of the mechanical system and
if, in accordance with the ideas of Louis de Broglie the linear momentum p is
interpreted as -lh/(2ir) times the gradient operator. This result surprised
Schrbdinger very much, since his theory was based on a physical model while
Heisenberg and his collaborators did not even admit the reasonableness of any
such model.
Schrdinger postulated that a scientific theory should be based on a
space-time continuum but he did not require that the continuum be that of the
laboratory. In fact, if one were dealing with a two-electron problem, the I
and k in (3) would assume the values 1,2,3,4,5,6 and so the continuum would be
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six-dimensional. On the other hand Heisenberg worked in a discontinuous space.
Indeed he argued that discontinuity occurs everywhere in atomic physics, as is
exemplified in any screen or Geiger counter experiment. Moreover he proposed
that, when a transition can be made into several possible states, it is the
observation of the physical process that makes the system jump into a
particular state (Moore 1989, p. 452).
Bohr and Schr3dinger became involved in a controversy regarding the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Schr5dinger did not accept the notion of
quantum jumps because he found it difficult to visualize them, and he rejected
the notion that a transition between two states can occur instantaneously.
Bohr agreed that quantum jumps cannot be visualized but he maintained that this
does not prove that quantum jumps do not exist; on the contrary, the
derivation of Planck’s law of radiation requires that the energy of the atom
have discrete values and that these values change discontinuously.
So far we have said little about the wave function itself. The
interpretation of quantum mechanics was discussed again at the Solvay
Conference held in Brussels during October 1927 and much of the discussion
centred round the physical interpretation of I. Under the assumption that
point particles exist within the atom Max Born had made the 41*1,_hypothesis that
the density of particles at any point within the atom is, apart from a
normalizing factor, just P41. Schrodinger assumed that there exists within the
atom not point particles but a charge and mass cloud and he made what he called the
- hypothesis, namely, that the cloud density at any point is given by a
normalized 414. Born and Heisenberg disagreed strongly with the Schrodinger
hypothesis and with Schrdinger’s assertion that it is nonsense to talk about
the trajectory of an electron within an atom. The views of Born and Heisenberg
seem to have been generally accepted at the conference but Einstein, de Broglie
and Schrodinger had strong reservations about them.
In a lecture entitled ‘The Transformation of the Physical Concept of the
World’ and delivered at Munich in 1930 Schro’dinger appeared to have moved his
position somewhat (Erwin Schr$dinger Collected Papers, 1984, Vol. 4, 600-608).
This is significant, since Schrdinger usually showed himself reluctant to
retreat from any position on which he had taken a stand. He described the two
opposing schools of thought by saying that one postulates discontinuous quanta
of energy and instantaneous jumps between energy states and that the other
claims that matter consists of continuous waves filling all space. On account
of the mathematical equivalence of matrix and wave mechanics mentioned earlier,
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each school is disinclined to condemn outright the views of the other one.
Schr’c5dinger accepts that waves, be they electromagnetic or matter-waves, are
not to be considered as purely objective descriptions of physical reality but
rather descriptions of the knowledge that we have of observations that have
been made. Such observations disturb one another. This leads to an
abandonment of any claim that science can provide a purely objective
description of Nature.
In order to understand the import of this last assertion we recall that a
matter of discussion among scientists and philosophers is the nature of the
world of the scientist — the world which the scientist contemplates in the
course of his professional activities and endeavours to interpret. Is the
world picture purely subjective, is it purely objective, is it partly
subjective and partly objective?
As an illustration of a world that is purely subjective we may recall
some features of the thinking of Kepler (1571-1630) when he was seeking a
description of the six planetary orbits known in his time (Heitler, 1963). His
first attempt was to associate the orbits with the five regular solids, namely,
the tetrahedron, cube, octohedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron. When this
attempt failed, he tried to employ the notion of the disciples of Pythagoras
that the motion of the planets is associated with musical sounds which make the
heavens resound with harmonies. Since Pythagoras had discovered that different
musical notes are associated with different lengths of vibrating strings,
Kepler sought to link certain whole-number relationships with the planetary
orbits. In the view of Kepler, God created the heavens as a perfect structure
and the planetary system was created in order that the harmonies could resound
in the heavens. It was found that there is a whole-number relationship between
the angular velocities of a specified planet at its perihelion and its
aphelion, and it was deduced that the system of six planets gives the whole
major or minor scale depending on whether we start with the perihelion or
aphelion of the planet Saturn.
In recent times the best known member of the subjective school was the
late Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington who posed the question: What is the minimum
set of observational data which is sufficient to form a basis for the whole
edifice of physical theory? To understand Eddington’s reply a distinction must
be made between quantitative assertions like ‘The velocity of light in vacuo
is 3xlO10cm. per second’, “The value of the reciprocal of the fine-structure
constant is 137”, and qualitative assertions like “The velocity of light is
independent of the motion of its source”, “Inside a hollow electrified shell
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there is no electric field”. Eddington’s reply to the above question was
framed in what is called Eddington’s Principle: All the quantitative
propositions of physics, that is, the exact values of the pure numbers that are
constants of science, may be deduced by logical reasoning from qualitative
assertions without making any use of quantitative data derived from observation
(McConnell, 1958).
Among qualitative assertions Eddington included the postulates of
impotence, for example, the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics and the
impossibility of constructing a perpetual motion machine: By applying his
Principle Eddington proposed that the value of the reciprocal of the
fine-structure constant is exactly the integer 137. He calculated the number N
of particles in the universe and found it to be equal to the number of
particles in Einstein’s cylindrical model of the universe, if it is assumed
that the ultimate constitutents of matter are electrons and protons. From N he
deduced the ratio of the electrical to the gravitational force between two
electrons. He also established a quadratic equation which gave the electron
and proton masses to a high degree of accuracy.
It may be said that the subjective pictures of the worlds which we have
described are unsatisfactory. Nowadays no reputable scientist would attempt to
defend the Pythagorean theory on which Kepler based his cosmology, even though
it led to the laws of planetary motion as a by-product. In Eddington’s
speculations a postulate of impotence like the impossiblity of constructing a
perpetual motion machine is something that emerged as a result of countless
experiments. Then the calculation of N by Eddington is no longer valid on
account of the many elementary particles that have since been discovered and
because Einstein’s cylindrical model of the universe is no longer accepted.
We now consider pictures of the world that were accepted as purely
objective. This means that no subjective features similar to those of Kepler
and Eddington are introduced. The use of the purely objective picture was
introduced by Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), who though a contemporary
of Kepler had a very different outlook on the universe. According to Galileo
scientific assertions must rely on observation and experience. A scientific
hypothesis must be mathematically and logically sound, and it must lead to
physical results which are in agreement with experiment. In this context one
should be careful not to assume that agreement with experiment implies that a
hypothesis is mathematically and logically sound. Indeed we have already
mentioned that Kepler’s laws of planetary motion were based on the discredited
theory of harmonies in the universe. Moreover in the twentieth century Bohr
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obtained the Balmer formula (1) by employing the classical theory of
Rutherford, according to which the electron in a hydrogen atom moves around the
proton in a stable orbit. However such an electron would radiate energy
continuously and the atom would quickly collapse.
The approach of Galileo was taken up generally by the scientific
community and in particular by Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727). Let us consider
Newton’s laws of motion. The force acting on a body at any time is equal to
the mass of the body multiplied by the rate of increase of velocity. This
determines the motion from one instant to the next. A similar situation occurs
for the succeeding time interval. Hence, if we know the position and velocity
of the body at any instant and the force at every instant of time, we can in
principle determine the path in which the body moves and the velocity of the
body at any point of its path. Thus Newtonian dynamics is deterministic.
Having discussed subjective and objective world pictures we return to the
Munich lecture of Schro1inger. Though this lecture was delivered on
6th. May 1930, it remained unpublished during the lifetime ‘of Schriidinger and
it was not freely available until 1984 when it appeared’ in Vol. 4 of his
collected papers. He wrote (Moore, 1989, pp. 250, 251):
Our mind, by virtue of a certain finite, limited capability, is by no means
capable of putting a question to Nature that permits a continuous series of
answers. The observations, the individual results of measurements, are the
answers of Nature to our discontinuous questionings. Therefore, perhaps in
a very important way, they concern not the object alone, but rather the
relations between subject and object . It is thus no longer so obvious
that repetition of observations must lead in the limit to an exact
knowledge of the object. When we interpolate the actual measurements by the
best possible means, they are embedded in continua •‘‘ that do not
represent the natural object in itself, but rather the relation between
subject and object.
The different wave forms, the old long-familiar electromagnetic waves
as well as the new so-called matter waves, are not to be considered as
purely objective descriptions of reality The wave functions do not
describe Nature in itself, but the knowledge that we possess at any given
time of the observations actually carried out. They allow us to predict the
results of future observations not with certainty and precision but with
just that degree of unsharpness and probability with which observations
actually made on the object permit predictions about it. The wave
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description that is presently accepted •.. is based on the fact that
observations mutually disturb one another — a circumstance that in one
respect increases our knowledge of the object, in one respect decreases it.
Most of us today feel that this necessary abandonment of a purely
objective description of Nature is a profound change in the physical
concept of the world. We feel it as a painful limitation of our right to
truth and clarity, that our symbols and formulas and the pictures connected
with them do not represent an object independent of the observer but only
the relation of subject to object. But is this relation not basically the
one true reality that we know? Is it not sufficient that it finds a solid,
clear, unequivocal expression, wherein in fact all truth exists? Why must
we exclude ourselves completely?
Some twenty years after Schr’dinger’s Munich lecture the physical chemist
and professional philosopher Michael Polanyl delivered a set of lectures in the
University of Aberdeen which covered among other subjects the questions of
subjectivity and objectivity in the acquisition of knowledge. In 1957 he
published these lectures with some modifications as a book with the title
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.
In the course of an analysis of what scientists usually mean by
‘objective’ he writes (Polanyi 1957, p. 16):
Modern man has set up as the ideal of knowledge the conception of natural
science as a set of statements which is ‘objective’ in the sense that its
substance is entirely determined by observation, even while its presentation
may be shaped by convention. This conception, stemming from a craving
rooted in the very depths of our culture, would be shattered if the
intuition of rationality in nature had to be acknowledged as a justifiable
and indeed essential part of scientific theory. That is why scientific
theory is represented as a mere economical description of facts; or as
embodying a conventional policy for drawing empirical inferences; or as a
working hypothesis, suited to man’s practical convenience — interpretations
that all overlook the rational core of science.
Thus, according to Polanyi, many modern scientists follow the logical system
called “positivism’. We have already noted that this system was followed
by the Copenhagen School when it was setting up matrix mechanics. On the other
hand Schrdinger stood aside from positivism and endeavoured to present a
rational picture of atomic processes.
Polanyi introduces prior belief as an element necessary for the acquisition of
all knowledge (Polanyi, 1957, pp. 266-7). “Tacit assent and intellectual
passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, affiliation to a
like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the
nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No intelligence,
however critical or original, can operate outside a fiduciary framework.’
While our acceptance of this framework is the condition for having any
knowledge, this matrix can claim no self-evidence Science exists only to
the extent to which there lives a passion for its beauty, a beauty believed to
be universal and external Our basic beliefs are indubitable only in the
sense that we believe them to be so’.
Polanyi concludes his argument with the words: This then is our
liberation from objectivism: to realize that we can voice our ultimate
convictions only from within our convictions — from within the whole
system of acceptances that are logically prior to any particular
assertion of our own, prior to the holding of any particular piece of
knowledge. If an ultimate logical level is to be attained and made
explicit, this must be a declaration of my personal beliefs. I believe that
the function of philosophic reflection consists in bringing to light, and
affirming as my own, the beliefs implied in such of my thoughts and
practices as I believe to be valid; that I must aim at discovering what I
truly believe in and at formulating the convictions which I find myself
holding; that I must conquer my self-doubt, so as to retain a firm hold on
this programme of self-identification.
Since scientific theory, as we know it, came to us from philosophers of
ancient Greece, it may be of interest to recall how the ancient Greeks looked
at the description of Nature. The notion that reality has a rational structure
expressible as scientific theory goes back to Thales of Miletus, who lived
about 600 B.C., and to the school of philosophers which he founded. This
notion implied that the world is intelligible. A feature of the scientific
method which predates Thales and which has been generally accepted until the
present century is that the intelligibility of the world is investigated as a
reality belonging to the world and exterior to us. This approach simplified
scientific discussion, the scientist as observer being excluded from the world
picture that he is endeavouring to build. However from the time that
Heisenberg proposed that the observation of a physical system makes it jump
into a particular quantum state he ceased to exclude the scientist from the
world picture. Heisenberg expresses his change of attitude as follows
(Heisenberg pp. 28, 29):
When we speak of the picture of nature in the exact science of our age, we
do not mean a picture of nature so much as a picture of our
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relationship with nature. The old division of the world into objective
processes in space and time and the mind in which these processes are
mirrored — in other words, the Cartesian difference between
res cogitans and res extensa — is no longer a suitable starting point for
our understanding of modern science. Science, we find, is now focused on
the network of relationships between man and nature, on the framework which
makes us as livingbeings dependent parts of nature, and which we as human
beings have simultaneously made the object of our thoughts and actions.
Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees itself
as an actor in this interplay between man and nature. The scientific
method of analysing, explaining and classifying has become conscious of its
limitations, which arise out of the fact that by its intervention science
alters and refashions the object of investigation. In other words, method
and object can no longer be separated. The scientific world-view has ceased
to be a scientific view in the true sense of the word.
The consequences of Heisenberg’s turning away from Machian philosophy
have been elaborated by Heelan (1972) in the following manner:
This involved a conversion from the classical model of a subjectless
scientific objectivity to the subject-dependent objectivity of quantum
mechanics. Quantum mechanics arose as the outcome of Werner Heisenberg1
reflection on the role of observables in science, By an “observable”he
meant a quantity that, though not imaginable in a classical space-time
model, was part of the interpretations of a-mathematical model and was
measurable in principle. His intuition rejected the objectivist
presuppositions of classical physics and, in a profoundly significant
epistemological shift, he consciously placed the measuring subject or
observer at the heart of quantum mechanics. The classical physics of his
time presupposed either no observer or one separated from matter and outside
of history. The quantum-mechanical observer, on the other hand, is one of
human scale who uses instruments of the same scale to observe
quantum-mechanical events and processes. Quantum-mechanical observers,
then, are as manifold as the kinds of instruments a scientist can use. The
most significant discovery of quantum mechanics, however, is the fact that
it is not possible to construct an instrument or a panel of instruments that
will give simultaneously the values of all the observable properties of a
quantum mechanical system. The most famous expression of this surprising
discovery is Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which relates the measure
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of inaccuracy (ax) of a position measurement (x) with the associated measure
of inaccuracy (p) of a momentum measurement (p) according to the inequality
ix.ip a h/(2ir), where h is the Planck constant.
It is plain that the above developments in scientific thinking have
serious implications for the traditional formulation of Applied Logic. Can
there be in principle a strictly and fully logical representation of scientific
knowledge? It seems clear that in the interplay between man and nature an
understanding is humanly developed, which is in part a tacit mental activity,
in part an explicit objective account. Until now the Logic of Science has been
consciously objectivist, since it has had only to deal with science as a set of
explicit statements. It is not equipped to deal with the tacit dimension of
science as personal knowledge, and therefore is not fully equipped to apply
itself to science viewed totally in both tacit and explicit dimensions.
(Bastable, 1975, p. 387).
When theoretical
or as a logical body of
conventional attitudes
about the methodology
pursuing research in h
carrying out research.
the proper place of sd
identified.
physics is examined either as an activity of knowing
knowledge, it poses challenging questions to
towards science. Such questions do not raise doubts
of science. They do not divert the scientist from
is special field or continuing to apply his own method of
However the questions call for serious investigation, if
ence in the context of human culture is to be
12.
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